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29 OCT '65

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Administrator for
International Affairs
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration

SUBJECT: NASA-Soviet Agreement

REFERENCE: Your Memo of 12 Oct 65

1. On the whole this seems to be a good plan with adequate provision for assuring quid pro quo exchange. In view of the present restrictions on information flow from the USSR on this subject versus the open policy of the United States, it would appear that the U.S. has much to gain and little to lose by such an agreement. The appendix on suggested contents of the published material has some areas which are not exactly as we would wish them but this is not particularly disturbing since it will certainly be revised before publication occurs.

2. Specific comments about various portions of the table of contents of the projected material may be useful at this point simply as background information for NASA in any future negotiations on details. First, we would suggest that the cost to the United States for translation is likely to be higher than that for the Soviets especially if the Soviets bring out numerous books and articles which have not previously been screened in the U.S. intelligence community. The Foreign Documents Division/CIA will be of great support here in avoiding duplication through use of its automated checking system for community translations. Next, the contributions for volume I, chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 will be essentially minimal from the USSR since we have concluded in the intelligence community that the Soviets are especially weak with no major program support for this kind of research. Everything we have seen on the Soviet work in these areas suggests that they are very far

NASA review completed

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behind here. A good deal of the U.S. information on sterilization and prevention of transfer of living material is directly applicable to methods of handling and culturing BW agents and comes from work at or supported by Ft. Detrick. If the United States provides full data here, it will certainly support some areas of weakness in the Soviet state of the art and, in fact, may help the Soviet BW defensive effort. The next point is with regard to volume II, chapters 3 and 5; it is possible these two should be combined for better treatment of the subjects and to avoid discrepancies particularly about after-effects on cosmonauts. There is certainly going to have to be some explanation here by the Soviets for problems which they seem to have that we seem not to have, i.e., orthostatic hypotension. Furthermore, it is hoped that the Soviets may explain in much more detail than heretofore their data on braking and landing hardware. Finally, although suit applications are not specified presently in volume III, it is possible they would be included in chapter 2. Some stipulation should be made that they should be incorporated in the material.

3. In conclusion we concur with the agreement as it now stands and suggest that only minor modifications need be contemplated for the actual textual arrangements.

[redacted] of the Office of Scientific Intelligence will be able to discuss the substantive material if you should desire further clarification.

ALBERT D. WHEELON
Deputy Director

Signature recommended:

[redacted]

Director of Scientific Intelligence

27 OCT 1965

Date

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OSI/LSD: [redacted] (26 Oct 65)

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